The Battle for Bahrain Continues

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More than a year after the “Arab spring” came to Bahrain, the fire has{ }still not died down. Although recent days were essentially no different{ }from those that preceded it, the Formula One Grand Prix held in the{ }kingdom brought the uprising back to the headlines, with the royal{ }family seeking to use the race to demonstrate business as usual, and the{ }Shiite opposition exploiting it to win people over to its cause.

The popular uprising in Bahrain began soon after the start of the{ }revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, but in recent months, as a result of{ }events in Syria, media attention has turned elsewhere. Meantime,{ }however, the protest of the Shiite majority – estimated to constitute{ }some 70 percent of the population – against the Sunni royal family has{ }continued on a low flame. Demonstrations take place every week,{ }generally in Shiite villages outside the capital, Manama, and not{ }infrequently, they deteriorate into serious violence. Thus far, the{ }regime has acknowledged the deaths of twenty people, while the{ }opposition claims that eighty have been killed.

Bahrain’s territory is 760 square kilometers. Its neighbor Qatar is{ }located to the southeast, while Saudi Arabia, connected to Bahrain via{ }the King Fahd Bridge built in the mid 1980s, is to the west. Bahrain’s{ }population is slightly over 1 million, about half of whom are foreign{ }workers. Bahrain was the first state in the Gulf to discover oil, but{ }because of the depletion of its reserves over the years, its main{ }revenues come from profits from a Saudi oil field and its role as a{ }banking and commercial center. Tourism and the hosting of US bases also{ }provide the royal family with a major source of income. Yet since the{ }outbreak of protests in Bahrain in February 2011, a great deal of{ }capital has been removed from the country and many businesses have{ }relocated, in particular to Doha and Dubai, because of fears about the{ }regime’s stability.

The Iranian revolution did not leave a significant mark on Bahrain,{ }partly because Bahraini Shiites are far from being a homogeneous group{ }politically – some are of Arab origin and others identify mainly with{ }the Iraqi religious establishment in Najaf. However, the royal family,{ }the House of Khalifa, makes frequent reference to the Iranian threat and{ }accusations of a Shiite plot in order to reject fundamental reforms in{ }the government. For their part, the Shiites have accused the House of{ }Khalifa of establishing an apparatus for apartheid and systematic{ }discrimination.

Human rights organizations in the West and the February 14 Youth{ }Movement, whose members last year clashed repeatedly with security{ }forces, held three “days of rage” during the Grand Prix in protest at{ }the decision to hold the race in spite of “the suppression of human{ }rights in the country.” (Last year the event was not held because of the{ }security situation.) The opposition did not attempt to prevent the{ }Grand Prix – it has no power to do so – but it did exploit the event in{ }order to draw attention to its demands: a constitutional monarchy, fair{ }elections, separation of powers, and an equal distribution of resources.

Hamad bin Isa, who early in the previous decade rose from emir to{ }king, announced his intention to implement changes in the constitution{ }of 2002 in accordance with the principles laid down by the “national{ }dialogue” and the commission of inquiry that he appointed. He noted that{ }the changes would bring about greater balance between the executive{ }branch and the legislative branch; and would also apply to appointments{ }of members of the upper house of parliament (who will be appointed by{ }him), parliament’s role in determining the annual budget, and more. The{ }opposition claims that these measures are lacking in substance.

The royal house is not monolithic – there are those, such as Khalifa{ }bin Salman, the king’s uncle and the prime minister for the past{ }forty-one years, who object to reforms, while others, such as Crown{ }Prince Salman bin Hamad, are apparently seeking to promote national{ }reconciliation. In the opposition as well there are those who will be{ }content with political reforms, while others want the king removed.

Bahrain’s proximity to Iran and its delicate ethnic balance make it{ }an attractive target for Iranian intervention. There have been periods{ }of tension between Iran and Bahrain since the Islamic Revolution, in{ }particular concerning Tehran’s support for Shiite opposition groups,{ }attempts at subversion, and territorial claims, all of which continually{ }feed suspicions about Iran’s intentions. In the wake of the violence in{ }Bahrain in the spring of 2011, military forces from Saudi Arabia and{ }the United Arab Emirates were sent to the island (Kuwait sent ships to{ }secure Bahrain’s ports). Some of the troops remained on the island even{ }after the emergency situation ended in June 2011. Iran, for its part,{ }continues to attack the Saudi “occupation” and to undermine Bahrain’s{ }sovereignty and the legitimacy of the internal reconciliation process{ }that Bahrain’s crown prince is promoting.

The Iranian media continues to incite against the royal house, and{ }Iran has even sent a “humanitarian” aid flotilla with about 200 Iranian{ }Shites, which accomplished little, fearful of a conflict with Gulf{ }Cooperation Council (GCC) forces. Last November, Saudi Arabia and{ }Bahrain accused the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force of operating a{ }terror cell that intended to blow up the King Fahd Bridge and the Saudi{ }embassy in Bahrain. The motive for these acts and others was apparently{ }the entry of forces under the GCC flag, which aided Bahrain in{ }containing the protest.

The instability in Bahrain once again highlights the depth of the{ }Sunni-Shiite/Arab-Iranian conflict on both sides of the Gulf. The fear{ }of Iran has led the Bahraini royal family to worsen its treatment of its{ }Shiite subjects and give citizenship to as many Sunnis as possible in{ }an attempt to balance the ratio between the ethnic groups. The West too{ }fears that free elections in Bahrain would produce a pro-Iranian{ }parliament that would oppose US forces remaining on the island and would{ }fall in line with Iranian policy. This explains the administration’s{ }relatively weak reaction to the oppressive measures of the Bahraini{ }regime. In US eyes, al-Khalifa, though he may be problematic, is aligned{ }with the “right” side.

Notwithstanding Bahrain’s small size, it has great importance.{ }Because of its strategic location, it plays a significant role in the{ }struggle with Iran, hosting US military installations, including the{ }Fifth Fleet’s base. Continued protests are liable to drive a wedge{ }between the United States, whose presence on the island to a large{ }extent depends on the regime’s stability, and the royal family. Even{ }now, the export of American weapons, some of which might be used to{ }suppress demonstrations, are criticized in Congress, and since the start{ }of the unrest in Bahrain the extent of deals has declined. Furthermore,{ }because of the unrest some of the US embassy’s activities have been{ }transferred to less sensitive areas, and if the situation in the country{ }deteriorates, this is liable to threaten the continued presence of the{ }Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain as well.

In an attempt to assuage Western criticism somewhat, in June 2011 the{ }king appointed an independent commission of inquiry, headed by a{ }leading international jurist, Egyptian Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni. In{ }November 2011 the commission published its conclusions, which were rife{ }with unprecedented criticism. It was determined that the security{ }forces, most of them Sunnis “imported” from countries such as Pakistan,{ }Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, made “excessive use of force” and that human{ }rights violations were systematic and intentional. In spite of the{ }criticism, implementation of the recommendations has been delayed.

The protest in Bahrain is enjoying a second wind courtesy of the Arab{ }spring, but its roots are deep and draw from Sunni-Shiite tension and{ }the fear of Iran. Thus far, the king’s attempts to bring about stability{ }through the granting of greater political freedom has only whetted the{ }appetite of the opposition and made the protests stronger and more{ }frequent. There are signs that the protest is showing the trappings of{ }an insurgency. Thus, for example, in the demonstrations, which were{ }generally non-violent, there is increasing use of Molotov cocktails and{ }even improvised explosive devices by Shiites against the security{ }forces.

The stability of Bahrain is not guaranteed. Its current weakness{ }plays into the hands of Iran, which wants to be seen as an actor with{ }influence on the island. Iran will likely continue to exploit the{ }complex relations of the Bahraini royal house with the Shiites in order{ }to signal that it has the ability to undermine Bahrain’s stability in{ }the event that it is attacked.

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